Public Law: Expropriation by Dakin, Melvin G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 41 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980: A Symposium
Winter 1981
Public Law: Expropriation
Melvin G. Dakin
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Melvin G. Dakin, Public Law: Expropriation, 41 La. L. Rev. (1981)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol41/iss2/12
EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO TAKE
The legislature vests the power to expropriate in "any domestic
or foreign corporation created for the piping and marketing of
natural gas."' A 1962 act 2 authorizes the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion to regulate the use of underground reservoirs for gas storage.
Reading the expropriation provision and the conservation statute in
pari materia, the court of appeal in Mid-Louisiana Gas Company v.
Sanchez' easily concluded that a pipeline company had the implied
authority to expropriate above and underground property interests
for the purpose of storing the gas as well as piping it to the public,
as integral parts of marketing and supplying gas to the public.4 In
Southern Natural Gas Company v. Poland5 another court of appeal
added, by interpretation, a facet to this area of law when multiple
interstate pipeline interests seek to share the construction of such
facilities. A storage facility was proposed to be developed by a
jointly-owned storage company, and the requisite certificate from
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had been ob-
tained by that company. Since the facility was not a pipeline,
however, expropriation proceedings were brought by one of the
shareholders, a Louisiana corporation "created for the piping and
marketing of natural gas"; in keeping with contractual ar-
rangements, the expropriated property then would be transferred to
the storage company for development. In response to the argument
that the expropriator lacked public purpose and Federal authoriza-
tion, the court sagely observed that circumstances may arise where
intricate dealings and conveyances between corporations will defeat
the ostensible public and necessary purpose, but these cir-
cumstances are not present here; "the mandate of strict construction
. . . does not permit a court to add further restrictive conditions to
those which are imposed . . . legislatively."' In passing, the court
also noted that "the FERC certificate relating to the operation of an
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 19:2(5) (1950 & Supp. 1974).
2. 1962 La. Acts., No. 190, amending LA. R.S. 30:22 (1950).
3. 280 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
4. 280 So. 2d at 411.
5. 384 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 530.
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interstate facility is some evidence that the public and necessary re-
quirement of state law has been fulfilled, but it is not the sole and
exclusive evidence. 7
NATURE OF THE INTEREST TAKEN
Louisiana coastal areas are threaded by a seemingly unending
maze of natural and artificial waterways. The waterways provide ac-
cess for hunting and fishing, for oil and gas exploration, and for
other developmental activities in the wetlands. Many canals are con-
structed upon private property but are interconnected with natural
navigable waterways; these artificial bodies of water provide tempt-
ing targets for commercial fishing and shrimping activities but are
available, however, only upon obtaining permission from the owners.
In Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.8 the issue presented to the United
States Supreme Court was whether such privately constructed
canals, by virtue of their interconnection with the "navigable waters
of the United States,"9 become part of such waterways and conse-
quently are open to use by all citizens of the United States without
a right to exclude in the owner of such canals." The Court had no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the private waters were a
part of the "navigable waterways of the United States" by virtue of
interconnection. In the interest of furthering navigation or com-
merce, Congress could regulate navigation thereon and assure its
continuance. However, the Court also found that opening the canals
to public use without permission from the owner constituted a tak-
ing of one of the "essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others.""
That right was held to fall within the category of interests that can-
not be taken by the government without payment of fair value."
7. Id, citing Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Soileau, 251 So. 2d 104, 106-07 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971). See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 317
n.171 & 362 n.31 (Supp. 1978).
8. 100 S. Ct. 399 (1979).
9. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
10. This issue also was presented to the Court in the companion case of Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979). The Vaughn case from Louisiana
presented a second issue which resulted in its remand to the state courts for further
proceedings; plaintiffs sought to establish in Vaughn, in addition to interconnection
with the navigable waters of the United States, that a pre-existing natural navigable
waterway had been diverted and destroyed by the construction of the private canals
and that those formations were thus artificial substitutes for such navigable water-
ways not subject to control under state law. 100 S. Ct. at 401.
11. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383, 391 (1979).
12. U.S. CONST., amend. V. It is anticipated that the Court will shortly announce a
definitive position in the more complex case of an alleged taking by rezoning because
the owner's use of property thereby is substantially curtailed or destroyed. In Agins v.
1981]
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The case provides an interesting parallel for State v. Jeanerette
Lumber & Shingle Company 3 in which a similar result was achiev-
ed. In Jeanerette Lumber the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the taking of a canal right of way for use in the construction of an
interstate highway through the Atchafalaya Floodway was for
highway purposes; the taking did not include future use of the canal
by the public for access to public recreational waters." The court
did not deny the power of the state to take for such a purpose but
held that the state must pay the owner for depriving him of the
right to exclude.
The perils of relying upon general legislation in the acquisition
of title to highway property, even for the laudable purpose of hus-
banding state tax dollars, are well illustrated in Folse v. State. 5 Six
decades ago, Louisiana embarked on a statewide system of roads; an
initial step in the process was a legislative transfer of the existing
parish roads to the State Board of Highways, subject to relocation
by that body as needed." The right of way in question originally had
been granted as a servitude to a railway by the landowner. The
right of way subsequently was transferred by the railway to the
parish to allow construction of a two-lane road. Finally, general
legislation transferred the servitude to the Board of Highways. In
the present era of four-lane highways, the state proposed to utilize
the full original right of way, but an abutting owner, asserting
City of Triburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the owner had no right to sue in inverse condemnation as for a taking but
would be entitled to sue for declaratory relief and possible invalidation of the zoning
regulation upon a showing that the owner had been deprived of substantially all
reasonable use of his property. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable
jurisdiction in the case and in its review must deal with an interpretation of the state-
ment by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." Id. at 422. The California court has asserted that the use of
the word "taking" by the Supreme Court was "solely to indicate the limit by which the
acknowledged social goal of land control could be achieved by regulation rather than
by eminent domain." 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29. In Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979), after noting that Congress had unquestioned power to
assure the public a free right of access if it so chose, the Court stated that whether a
taking occurred under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. was "an entirely separate
question." Id. at 390. In Kaiser Aetna creating such free public access was deemed to
go "so far beyond ordinary regulation . . . as to amount to a taking." Id. at 392. In
Agins, the issue well might be whether zoning which deprives the owner of substan-
tially all reasonable use of his property similarly exceeds "ordinary regulation" and is
hence a taking subject to payment of compensation.
13. 350 So. 2d 847 (La. 1977).
14. Id. at 856.
15. 356 So. 2d 411 (La. 1978); on remand, 377 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
16. LA. R.S. 48:191 (Supp. 1955 & 1979).
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peaceful possession for the requisite period, sought injunctive relief.
The state countered by asserting title, although it had not taken the
precaution of obtaining from the parish a formal grant of the right
of way outside the road surface proper,'7 as it had in other instances.
Perhaps piqued by this oversight, the parish authorities executed a
blanket abandonment of any remaining interest in the right of way
to contiguous landowners. In this posture of the case, the state prob-
ably spent in litigation what it might have spent in acquiring the
property by voluntary deed or by expropriation proceeding. None-
theless, had the state been successful in establishing that the
general legislation transferred whatever interest the police jury
possessed, it might have saved tax dollars. Instead, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found it a "fair reading of the [transfer] statute"'"
that this result was not the legislative intention; the court also
found that a parish resolution of "blanket abandonment"'" was insuf-
ficient to convey title to the landowner. The final result was a vic-
tory for the landowner without title but in peaceful possession of
the right of way outside the road surface proper; disturbance of that
possession by the state was deemed to warrant damages in the
amount of 75 per cent of the fair market value of the land taken.
The true owner, never determined but presumably the parish, would
have been entitled to full compensation for the value of the land.
DAMAGES
State v. Wilson" illustrates again the importance of adequate
proof if advantage is to be taken of the expanded constitutional
language that "property owners are to be compensated to the full
17. The highway cases decided under the St. Julien v. Morgan Louisiana & Texas
R.R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883), doctrine have established that only the road surface
and supporting areas over which dominion clearly could be shown to have been exer-
cised would be vested in the state. Thus, in State v. Thurston, 338 So. 2d 154 (La,
App. 2d Cir. 1976), the state was unopposed in its position that a servitude had been
established in the paved surface of a road but was unsuccessful in an attempt to prove
that the shoulders and ditches had also been acquired. There was no showing of con-
struction or other dominium "which would have clearly indicated to the landowner at
that time the dimensions of the land area which the department intended to occupy for
a public purpose." Id. at 156. The St. Julien rule was also successfully invoked in Holt
v. City of Bossier City, 384 So. 2d 495, 498 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), against a co-owner
who knew of the construction of drainage facilities across her property and made no
protest; of course, acquiescence was deemed to establish only the right of the city to
expropriate and did not preclude a claim for compensation. See also M. DAKIN & M.
KLEIN. supra note 7, 164-65.
18. 356 So. 2d at 414.
19. Id. at n.5.
20. 372 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
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extent of ... loss."'" Only a small amount of land was taken from the
owner, but the forty-acre tract was rendered less valuable for small
acreage homesites; the interstate highway for which the property
was taken isolated the tract from more populated areas. Severance
damages were awarded accordingly. In addition, a commercial build-
ing was rendered useless for its original purpose by the taking. But
the owner submitted only an estimate of cost to convert to residen-
tial use instead of calculating business loss by submitting proof of
the present value of the profits that the building would have pro-
duced. Since the building was not shown to be damaged, and "cost
to cure" usually is used only in lieu of damages, the latter item was
disallowed.2" Had there been proof, presumably the court would have
allowed the present value of profits lost by the taking, since only
thus would the owner have been "fully compensated."
State v. Willet23 brings into sharp focus an anomaly stemming
from the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Gar-
rick"' almost a decade ago: Citing Garrick as its authority, the court
of appeal in Willet awarded severance damages to an owner ag-
grieved by a partial taking for highway improvements. The court
specifically held that such "damages are allowable even though ...
not peculiar to the complaining owner but rather are suffered by the
neighborhood generally." 5 In Garrick narrow strips had been taken
from property frontage for the purpose of widening a highway; sev-
erance damages of 35 percent of the value of the remainders had
been allowed to compensate for the loss attributable to "noise, dirt,
vibration ... resulting from the increased traffic after the construc-
tion of the by-pass .". The circuit court in Garrick" disallowed
such severance damages. Citing Reymond v. State,2 the appellate
court made an abortive attempt to establish for severance damages
the rule applicable to an owner claiming damages only because of
proximity to a public work-such damages "must be peculiar to the
subject property and not such as are suffered generally by other
landowners in the area." '29 The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
21. LA. CONST. art. I § 4. The Louisiana Supreme Court now has approved in prin-
ciple such compensation in State v. Constant, 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979). See Note, Ex-
propriation" Compensating the Landowner to the Full Extent of His Loss, 40 LA. L.
REV. 817 (1980).
22. 372 So. 2d at 634.
23. 383 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
24. 260 La. 340, 256 So. 2d 111 (1972).
25. 383 So. 2d at 1352.
26. 260 La. 342, 256 So. 2d at 112.
27. 242 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
28. 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375 (1970).
29. 242 So. 2d at 280.
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the Reymond parallel, characterizing it as "not an expropriation
case."3 Instead the court held that, if a partial taking occurs,
severance damages properly may include loss in value resulting
from the construction of the improvement in the form of enhanced
levels of noise, smoke, and vibration, despite the fact that similar
damages are suffered by adjacent owners.3 The Willet holding no
doubt will be known as "the total effect" rule since, as formulated,
damages are allowed "not because the remainders were damaged
[but] . ..because the total effect of the contemplated public work
subjected the properties to increased traffic, noise and vibration
which in turn depreciated their value." 2
Thus, we have fixed in the jurisprudence what a dissenting
justice in Garrick33 protested was the anomaly of awarding
damages-a small piece of land is taken from an owner who is com-
pensated, but no damages are awarded to nearby owners from
whom no land is taken but who suffer equivalent damage. In his
opinion such damages are not special to this owner but general to
the entire neighborhood and hence noncompensable. He suggests
that severance damages should continue to be "the consequences of
diminution in value by reason of a partial taking and not by reason
of the use made by the public body of other land than that involved
in the partial taking. These latter damages, if compensable, should
not exceed the liability of private persons for maintenance of public
nuisances."34
PROCEDURE
For several decades it had been "settled jurisprudence" that the
only issues before the court in an expropriation case are the value of
the property taken and severance damages and the preliminary
issues of public purpose and necessity; a tort claim, although also a
result of the expropriator's actions, was relegated to a separate
30. 260 La. at 345, 256 So. 2d at 112.
31. 260 La. at 349-51, 256 So. 2d at 114-15. The parallel that might have been
argued more successfully since it could not have been dismissed as "not an expropria-
tion case" is the rule for treatment of benefits conferred by an improvement when the
benefits are to be set off against an award of severance damages; for such benefits to
be set off the expropriator must show successfully that a specific piece of property has
benefited from an improvement in excess of other property in the area, thus excluding
general benefits from any possibility of setoff.
32. 383 So. 2d at 1352.
33. State v. Garrick, 260 La. at 357, 256 So. 2d at 117 (Barham, J., dissenting)
(1972).
34. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-
Neighboring Landowners-Dangerous Activities, 31 LA. L. REv. 231-47 (1971).
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suit.35 However, in State v. Ellender" the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that, in a taking for highway purposes, judicial economy will be
served better by permitting a tort claim stemming from damage in-
flicted by the expropriator (but not directly by the taking) to be
raised by reconventional demand as permitted in actions generally.37
The argument that permitting such a demand would "impede the
process of expropriation" was rejected since, under a quick-taking
statute, the process in fact would not be delayed. The court also
noted that permitting the claim to be raised in reconventional de-
mand would honor further the constitutional proscription against
unreasonable delay in providing adequate remedies for the citizens.
Justice Holmes once inveighed against use of "the petty larceny
of the police power""8 rather than the comparative fairness of ex-
propriation and its provisions of "just compensation." Housemaster
Corporation v. City of Kenner 9 might be an illustration of the ex-
tent to which seemingly harmless error will be judicially utilized to
temper undue harshness in the application of the police power to
property deemed appropriate for demolition as a nuisance. Since no
physical taking occurs, no issue of compensation exists in such cases.
Nonetheless, destruction of existing property values may happen
and, if renovation is possible, the owner must be afforded reasonable
opportunity to preserve those values. Thus normal Louisiana pro-
cedures require an engineering report to support a show cause
order for demolition, and the owner must be afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate at a hearing that repairs and renovation are possi-
ble." In Housemaster notice was given, a hearing held, and a show-
ing made, but the showing was deemed inadequate by the city. How-
ever, instead of seeking judicial review of the final demolition order
within the statutory appeal period, the owner ignored the order and
requested a permit to renovate. The permit was denied on the basis
of the pending demolition order, and the owner sought injunctive
relief. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that notice of the hearing
was defective and invalidated the order of demolition; a new hearing
thus was required with opportunity for judicial review in the event
demolition was ordered. The defect, consisting of failure to identify
the person served as president of the corporation holding title to
the building, might have been treated as harmless error, since the
35. See State v. Mouledeous, 199 So. 2d 185, 190-91 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). See
also M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 348.
36. 379 So. 2d 1069 (La. 1980).
37. Id. at 1071.
38. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 457 (M. HOWE ed. 1953).
39. 374 So. 2d 1240 (La. 1979).
40. LA. R.S. 33:4762 (1950).
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affected parties did appear in fact and were afforded an opportunity
to adduce evidence. But the court, noting that it is "axiomatic that
procedural provisions and substantive restraints [on the police
power] must be strictly contrued,"" held the proper owner had not
been notified, and, as a consequence, further opportunity must be af-
forded the proper party to present his case against demolition to
avoid unnecessary property loss.
Occasional inadvertent takings seem inevitable in the construc-
tion and maintenance of the sprawling interstate highway system;
the time of valuation and the running of prescriptive periods are
often crucial issues. Thus in Reddel v. State2 the owner was
unaware of the taking at the time of the appropriation, and fairness
was deemed to dictate that the time of valuation be fixed as of the
time of acquisition of such knowledge. In Powell v. State" the time
of valuation was not an issue, because the state constructively ad-
mitted a value "at all times pertinent."" However, the state did
argue that prescription'" should run from the time of the actual tak-
ing. The court refused to "ascribe to the legislature such a harsh in-
tent"" and here also fixed the date of acquisition of knowledge as
the time from which prescription would run, citing Chenevert v.
State.'7 The court further noted that this situation was the same
type of inverse condemnation suit as in Reddel." The landowner also
prayed for "rentals" from the time of taking, but his claim was
refused; in lieu thereof he was allowed interest from the time of tak-
ing, the court finding this disposition reasonable, since the state
then should have compensated the owner. The award of a possibly
higher value by virtue of determining the value at the time the tak-
ing is discovered can be justified as a deterrent against careless ap-
propriations of private property.'9
Not all utilities have yet put into practice procedures dictated
41. 374 So. 2d at 1242-43.
42. 340 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
43. 383 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 429.
45. LA. R.S. 13:5111 (Supp. 1975).
46. 383 So. 2d at 429.
47. 345 So. 2d 960 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
48. 383 So. 2d at 428.
49. Full knowledge of the taking existed in Donohoe v. State, 366 So. 2d 598 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979), but no express permission was given; the owner of the property (a
subservient estate because of natural drainage) was entitled to be compensated for
damages due to the intrusion of a state-constructed culvert. Since the initial servitude
was not created by "the industry of man," LA. CIv. CODE art. 660, and since an in-
crease in the flow of water by virtue of the installation was not shown, only nominal
damages for the taking were awarded. 366 So. 2d at 602.
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by the decision in Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Caldwell."°
That decision required that the expropriator plead and prove a pro-
posed taking does not interfere more than is necessary with the con-
venience of the landowner. Thus, in Southwestern Electric Power
Company v. Tally,51 while the utility made a strong case in economic
and engineering terms for the location of a proposed servitude, the
expropriator made no showing that convenience of the landowner
had been considered specifically and rejected because of such econ-
omic and engineering studies. Hence, it could not be stated that the
utility had discharged the burden of proof imposed upon it by the
legislature; the court said that since expropriation laws are in
derogation of common right, those statutes must be strictly con-
strued.2 In Caldwell, since an interpretation of the statute or an-
nouncement of its requirements had not yet occurred, the case was
remanded for trial on amended pleadings;53 in Tally the expropria-
tion prayed for was simply denied. 4
50. 360 So. 2d 848 (La. 1978).
51. 377 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
52. 377 So. 2d at 367.
53. 360 So. 2d at 852.
54. 377 So. 2d at 368.
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